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Spacecraft Charging
• Low altitude plasma - Subject of this talk  
• Cold, dense plasma that most often suppresses satellite  
surface charging
– Roughly similar to an air ionizer
• Can also cause charging by interaction with spacecraft voltage 
sources   
• Encountered at orbital speeds (8 km/sec)
• High altitude plasma 
• A problem at Geostationary, polar orbits, and radiation belts
– Many charging anomalies including loss of spacecraft
• Energetic, rarified plasma, able to charge satellites to high 
voltages directly
• Encountered at variety of speeds (trapped plasma, solar wind)
• Particle Radiation
• Trapped radiation and auroral arcs
• Encountered over  range of speeds up to relativistic
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The Plasma
• Our natural plasma varies 
with altitude, past and 
current solar activity, 
Earth’s variable 
geomagnetic index, 
latitude, longitude, and 
local time
• Cold dense plasma in low 
earth orbit (LEO) gives 
rise to different problems 
than hot, rarified plasma 
at Geostationary orbit 
(GEO)
Photo credit: NASA
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International Space Station
• 440+ tons, mostly 
aluminum
• 100 meters wide
• 160 VDC primary power 
from 8 wings(120VDC 
secondary) is grounded to 
hull
– “S” bonding or better 
between all elements
• Russian System (28VDC) 
is not grounded
• Oxide and other insulators 
cover outer surface
• Flies in “F” region of 
ionosphere at 400km
Photo credit: NASA
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Is ESD a problem to ISS?
• A hazard occurs whenever one disturbs an 
equilibrium: i.e., while passing any sort of energy 
into anything of value to you.
• ESD: the act of passing electricity through 
something of value to you. 
==A hazard
• We have non-bonded conducting objects 
(especially including crew) in plasma with B fields 
and E fields
– Lots of ways to make an electrostatic discharge
== Lots of hazards
Page No. 7
ISS_CM_019 (Rev 08/2009) 
Therefore:
• The risk of electrostatic discharge through 
EVA crew was elevated in 2001 to be one 
of the top ISS program risks
– Only recently downgraded.
– This presentation shows why
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The Players:
• The EVA crewperson (the potential victim…)
• The Potential Antagonists:
– The ISS metallic structure
– The ISS thin oxide and insulating coatings
– The ISS high voltage solar power arrays
– The natural plasma 
• (and sun/earth influences on it)
– The artificial plasma created by ISS PCUs
– The Earth’s magnetic field (“B”)
– The EVA suit(s) and tools/tethers
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The crewperson is 
not bonded to structure
• Anodized surfaces
• Some very-well 
grounded exposed 
conductors 
exist
• Insulating blankets
Photo credit: NASA
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Worrisome Features:
• Medical sensors 
with metal 
connector shells 
inside suit
• Sweat-soaked crew
• Metal tools and 
caddy that bolts to 
isolated metal 
components of suit 
and are connected 
only by the 
crewman inside
• Exposed 
joints/bearings
• Metal tethersPhoto credit: NASA
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Neuro-Physical Active 
Regions under EVA 
shock
Douglas Hamilton Space 
Medicine JSC 
Shock Paths 
Identified by EVA 
Photo credit: NASA
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Russian “Orlan” suit
• Single-piece 
construction has 
sewn covers over 
most metal fittings
• Rarely (never) far 
from ISS centerline 
(neutral potential)
Photo credit: NASA
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People
• Only recently modeled with sufficient 
accuracy to predict true neuro-physiological 
responses
• 335 million 1x1x1mm voxels define the 
expected internal conductance/ impedance 
• Consistent E-fields at every 1mm2 interface 
sought throughout body in 3D
=Weeks in a supercomputer
THEN the result is fed to a neural model
=Many more weeks in a supercomputer
Brooks Man anatomical model with a cutout 
(left image) and with skin, fat and muscles 
removed (right image). 
Neuro-Physical Active 
Regions under EVA shock
Douglas Hamilton Space Medicine JSC 
Shock Paths 
Identified by EVA 
Photo credit: NASA
August 24th, 2009
Douglas Hamilton Space Medicine JSC 
Heart
Spinal cord
Spinal cord
Gut
Locate Skin Contact Areas to 
Analyze Worse Case
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The Hazards: Simplest spacecraft charging 
hazard causes in low earth orbit: 
• Un-encapsulated high voltage PV power systems, with 
negative end grounded to spacecraft conducting 
structure, that can collect electrons from the cold dense 
ionospheric plasma
• Large metallic spacecraft structures that generate 
motional EMF when flying through earth’s magnetic field 
at orbital speed (VxB.L) and also collect electrons for the 
plasma. 
Page No. 17
ISS_CM_019 (Rev 08/2009) 
Photo credits: NASA
Page No. 18
ISS_CM_019 (Rev 08/2009) 
The “Negative” Plasma Hazard:
• Electrons preferentially attracted to exposed positive 
conductors, while ions not as mobile.
– Cold dense plasma problem: not seen at GEO
– “High side” circuit potential moves down, toward neutral
• Voltage regulation causes the return side (equipotential
with hull) to move below neutral
• Oxide layers prevent ion neutralization of negative plane.
• Un-bonded crew then at one potential while ISS Structure 
moves to another
– Surface dielectric breakdown can make a highly-
localized, large discharge  (ISS is 0.01 Farad 
capacitance)
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Negative Plasma Solutions
• This is not just a crew problem: Discharge can break 
down dielectrics, create EMI, if too high
• Solved with plasma contactor unit (PCU) to make slow 
neutral plasma “bath” around ISS.
– Essentially forces the collected electrons back into 
the environment in the form of charged particles.
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And if the PCU fails?
• Redundant PCUs
• Point the active solar array
surfaces to wake
– Potentially significant power 
loss to ISS
• Monitor the plasma environment
– If weak enough, can live with worst-case potential
– Crew susceptible earlier than dielectrics: we live 
with some dielectric risk and generally only turn on 
PCUs during EVAs 
Photo credit: NASA
ISS Plasma Contactor Unit (1 of 3)
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How do we know what the 
environment is?
• The Plasma Interaction Model (PIM)
• FPMU on ISS
• The Floating Potential Measurement Unit (FPMU) was developed by 
Utah State University’s Space Dynamics Laboratory (USU-SDL) to 
study surface charging of the International Space Station (ISS).
• The charging of the ISS is a function of ambient plasma density and temperature, the 
active state of PV solar array, as well as VISS × B induced potentials. A model of ISS 
surface charging, the Plasma Interaction Model (PIM), has traditionally used plasma 
densities and temperatures derived from the IRI model to predict the ISS charging levels. 
The IRI empirical model is an international project that provides users with global and 
temporal variations of electron density, electron temperature, ion temperature, ion 
composition (O+, H+ , He+ , NO+ , O+2 ), ion drift, and Total Electron Content. However, 
the model only provides average climatologies of the ionosphere parameterized by solar 
activity, season and geomagnetic activity indices. Due to the nature of parameters the 
model is based upon the actual day-to-day variability of the ionosphere can approach up to 
30% of the model provided averages. Thus, in situ instrumentation becomes important for 
high spatial and temporal resolution observations of local plasma parameters that will 
eventually be used to validate the ISS surface charging model PIM.
From: NASA Technical Report: “Data Analysis of the Floating Potential Measurement Unit aboard the International 
Space Station”: Aroh Barjatya, Charles M. Swenson, Donald C. Thompson, Kenneth H. Wright, 2009
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Photo credit: NASA
Photo credit: Utah State University Space Dynamics Laboratory
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We worry about Positive, too
• This is a VxB.L problem with a long metal 
boom perpendicular to B field lines, moving at 
high speed
• Amplifies in concentrated field near Earth’s 
poles
– Local potential at truss tip changes rapidly from 
the last time the crew made contact
• Renewed ground contact makes a capacitive inrush: 
– an “AC” momentary shock hazard
– Some conducting surfaces on suit can act like a 
collector, giving electrons a path through 
crewperson to local ground
• A “DC” hazard.
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Irony:
• Ironically, the positive hazard is 
exacerbated when the plasma contactor 
removes the negative hazard.  
– Tries to keep the ground plane from 
suppressing 
– pushes the end of truss over the top in 
positive potential hazard 
Page No. 25
ISS_CM_019 (Rev 08/2009) 
0 V
12.5 V
Illustration
• ISS operates in electrically 
conductive plasma environment
• PCU’s provide ISS ground to 
plasma
• As truss flies through the magnetic 
field a voltage is created along it
– Combined with PCU’s creates positive 
potentials  on ISS conducting 
structure
– High potentials only seen outboard of 
rotating truss joint
– Plasma acts as a common ground
+- ISS
EMU
Representative circuit diagram
Plasma 
represents 
common 
ground
Contact 
with 
structure
C
urrent flow
0V
One momentary 
condition with 
PCU’s on
Image credits: Boeing
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Positive Risk Mitigation
• The ISS Program has enacted all of the following: 
1. Revisit probabilistic risk assessment
• Result: Crew severe Injury Risk is 1.94E-4 per 5.5 hrs of EVA outboard of rotary joint in un-modified suit, 1.54E-4
with sensor cable modified as listed below, vs. 5.99E-5 for a 6.5 hour EVA when not in positive plasma region of 
concern.  Risk downgraded from catastrophic consequence to severe injury consequence.
2. Isolation of US Suit external conductive pathways
• Result: MMWS can be electrically isolated from the EMU and coated to prevent electrical contact
– Approved at Program review 10/15/ 2009. Now available on-orbit
– Isolates the most probable plasma charging/contact area
– Other isolations not practical without  major suit contract mods & recertification
3. Isolation of US Suit internal conductive pathways
• Result: Safety panel approved a temporary taping of the connections inside the US suit when needed for EVAs 
that include activity in the positive charge region. 
– Fixes the most probable conducting path to the crewperson & dramatically reduces the AC portion of the risk cause
– Now available on-orbit .  First implemented 2010
– Other isolations not practical without  major suit contract mods & recertification
4. Adjustment of plasma potential via ISS attitude
• Result: “sideways” attitude removes the VxB component .  The +/-YVV-Znadir stage attitudes are approved
within NASA & Boeing for overlapping ranges from zero to +/-55 deg Beta.(85% of all days)
• No critical ops in problem area have been identified requiring immediate high-beta EVA: at worst a nuisance of 
waiting for right conditions, operating in degraded conditions.
5. Refine study of neuro-physical pathways, impedances, and responses
• Result: Detailed model shows neuro-physical startle/strong-reflex/pain response (not death) is still possible
– Corroborated with new International standards for shock exposure
– Permanent injury is still criedible
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Risk Mitigation Continued
• Program has examined and rejected the following:
1. Intentional grounding of US Suit to bypass crewperson in 
circuit 
• Result: May 2010 Program Control Board concurred with “no action”  
recommendation. Confirmed that such intentional grounding induces the 
AC portion of the hazard, and  also introduces new tangling risks to the 
crewmember
2. Adjustment of plasma potential via selective use of 
PCUs
• Result: Not adopted.  Explored during 2010 hazard discussion.  
Dependent upon plasma density at the time, which in theory could enable 
the removal of unnecessary PCU control. Removing PCU clamping when 
not necessary will drop outboard potentials to acceptable levels, but this 
solution is variable on a daily basis, gambles slightly the negative plasma 
hazard, and is not reliably available for planning an EVA.    
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Additional Mitigations
• Worked with partners to encapsulate arrays
• Developed Plasma Interaction Model (PIM)
• Launched Floating Potential Measurement Unit 
(FPMU)
• Built and launched Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs)
• Created real-time forecast method for Pre-EVA 
plasma effects
• Created array off-pointing logic for PCU failures
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Conclusion
• EVA activity in the ISS program encounters several 
dangerous ESD conditions 
• The ISS program has been aggressive for many years to find 
ways to mitigate or to eliminate the associated risks
• Investments have included:
– Major mods to EVA tools, suit connectors & analytical tools
– Floating Potential Measurement Unit
– Plasma Contactor Units
– Certification of new ISS flight attitudes
– Teraflops of computation
– Thousands of hours of work by scores of specialists
– Monthly management attention at the highest program levels
• The risks are now mitigated to a level that is orders of 
magnitude safer than prior operations.
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Backup: Space Station Electrical 
Bonding Requirements
Documented #SSP 30245: 
3.2.1.1 CLASS H BONDING (SHOCK HAZARD)
Class H bonds shall be applied to electrical and electronic equipment, assembled elements or structure and between mated, 
docked or berthed spacecraft. …A  ow resistance bond of less than 0.1 ohm to conducting structure at each termination 
and breakpoint. The bonding path may be through the equipment at which the conduit terminates.
3.2.1.2 CLASS R BONDING (HIGH FREQUENCY POTENTIALS, ANTENNAS)
A Class R bond shall be applied where electronic devices require a low noise, near equipotential environment, a minimum 
potential drop or where the bond is part of a safety mandated, high frequency (minimum delay time) function such as fault 
clearing in the presence of an Intervehicular Activity (IVA) or Extravehicular Activity (EVA). 
3.2.1.2.2 NEARBY CONDUCTORS
All conducting items having any linear dimension of 30 centimeters (cm) or more installed within one–fourth of the wavelength of
the highest operating frequency of wiring carrying signals with frequencies that exceed 10 MHz, such as transmitting or 
receiving antenna lead–ins, shall have a bond to structure at least every interval that is one–fourth the wavelength of the 
highest operating frequency. Direct metal–to–metal contact is preferred. If a jumper/strap is used, the jumper/strap shall 
comply with the requirements of Class R bonds.
3.2.1.2.3 SPACE STATION STRUCTURE
Space Station structure shall be so designed that the conducting members provide a uniform low impedance path through 
inherent bonding during construction. Structure bond design shall include accommodation of the effects of operational 
vibration and resultant breakdown of insulating finishes or intermittent electrical contact.
3.2.1.3 CLASS S BONDING (STATIC CHARGE )
3.2.1.3.1 CONDUCTING STRUCTURAL ITEMS
All isolated structural conducting items having an area greater than 100 square centimeters which carry fluids in motion, or 
otherwise are subject to frictional charging or plasma–induced current flow or charging, shall have a mechanically secure 
conducting connection to conductive structure. The resistance of the connection shall be less than 1 ohm…
